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COMMUNITY CONTROL, PUBUC POLICY, AND
THE LIMITS OF LAW
David L. Kirp*
about the governance of public education is no longer
the exclusive domain of a limited number of professionals and
a complement of academic critics. Rarely does one pick up a newspaper without encountering assertions by community groups-generally poor, black, and organized-of the right to run their own
schools. Those assertions challenge existing assumptions about the
proper allocation of power and responsibility and suggest a different
understanding of what interests in education require formal political recognition. Those assertions also reveal conflicts within the
field of education that have not previously existed or-perhaps more
accurately-have not previously been noticed.
The impetus for community control of schools, or school decentralization (the terms have come to be used interchangeably), has
developed in the past four years, breathtakingly quickly for the
heretofore placid realm of education.1 The urban community control movement began in New York City with an experiment sponsored by the Ford Foundation and designed to ease tensions in one
querulous Harlem school district. This first experiment was rapidly
transformed into a series of state-endorsed district-wide undertakings, and ultimately into a mandate for restructuring public education for the whole of New York City.2 Other cities, including
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Washington, D.C., Detroit, and Boston, are not far behind New
York. 3
New York's experience with decentralization has been acrimonious. That city experienced two extended city-wide strikes by the
teachers' union, racial tensions distinguished chiefly by the intensity
of rhetorical invective, union charges that the teachers' right to due
process of law was being violated, and countercharges by community
leaders that there had been political sabotage of an educational experiment. While the trauma of the New York situation will probably not be repeated (New York is a most unreliable political
weathervane), what Jason Epstein has called "a conflict of opposing
principles reflecting powerful and apparently irreconcilable class
interests"4 will recur elsewhere. Struggles are inherent in the very
notion of community control over leadership and power and the
resultant control over jobs and finances and curriculum.
Implicit in arguments over who should run the schools are conflicting assumptions concerning what interests demand recognition
and how power should be allocated. The nominal terms may vary:
educators speak 0f professionalism; educational researchers focus on
social-class effects; politicians worry about the availability of dollars.
But the power dimension, with its inevitable racial overtones, is
fundamental. By considering the conflict to be one over power, one
can more easily understand both the protracted and frustrating
fifteen-year effort to disestablish separate schools in the South and
the hostility in the North to such presumably beneficial arrangements as integrated metropolitan school districts. Concern about the
allocation of power illuminates opposition to proposals for community controlled schools-proposals which would grant "communities," including racially defined enclaves, real power over teachers,
curriculum, and dollars.
That power and race are central to an understanding of the bitterness generated by community control indicates that education
has come to provide a setting for larger unresolved social and political problems. The debate about educational policy points up basic
3. In two states, decentralization has been the subject of considerable controversy.
In Michigan, decentralization of Detroit's public schools has been opposed by parents
and state legislators who object to the substantial integration that would result if the
Detroit school board's plan were adopted. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1970, § I, at 51, col. I.
In Massachusetts, legislation which would have permitted cities larger than 150,000 to
decentralize their schools has been sent to committee and proponents are not sanguine
about its chance of re-emerging. Personal communication from Lawrence Kotin, Mass.
Law Reform Institute, June 8, 1970. A suit seeking decentralization of Boston's schools
is currently being pressed. See text accompanying notes 104-06 infra.
4. Epstein, The Brooklyn Dodgers, NEW YORK R.Evmw OF BooKS, Oct. 10, 1968, in
M. BERUBE &: M. GITIEL, supra note 2, at 819.
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and ignored ideological differences that divide interests in our society. It embodies what Epstein, speaking of the New York City
school crisis, termed a "spontaneous and apparently irresistible surge
of democratic fundamentalism, arising from a revulsion toward
established social and political institutions."5 It is the consequence
of what sociologist Robert Nisbet, ·writing some years earlier, diagnosed as "the failure of our present democratic and industrial scene
to create new contexts of association and moral cohesion within
which the smaller allegiances of men will assume both functional
and psychological significance."6
Those concerned about education rightly regard the debate over
community control as important, whether measured in terms of
dollars, power over jobs, or power over children's lives. Northern
black leaders view the debate as an all-or-nothing contest: since the
joint efforts of blacks and Northern liberals to promote integration
have failed, blacks have concluded that they can attain "legitimacy"
only by asserting dominion over their mm community.7 In seeking
community control, they come into conflict with traditional conceptions of governance and power. They also encounter possible
constitutional challenges.
This Article deals with those two points of conflict-disputes
about governance, race, and political power; and constitutional concerns, rooted in Brown v. Board of Education, 8 about racially heterogeneous education. Both are central to understanding, and to giving
content to, the disagreements about community control. The questions about power provide a context within which to understand
the terms of the debate. The constitutional discussion suggests some
inevitable judicial difficulties in resolving disputes that emerge from
the debate. Such questions are increasingly before the courts, whose
decisions may alter the bounds of acceptable conduct in ways that
permit or deny the legitimacy of new arrangements such as community control, or for that matter old arrangements such as de facto
segregation.
This Article begins with a foray into the social context of the
control question, noting briefly the competing social philosophies
that form the basis for discussion. It then examines the constitutional questions, reconsidering the implications of the ambiguous
5. Id. at 332.

6. R.

NISBET, COllll\lUNITY AND POWER

(formerly THE

QUEST FOR COMMUNITY)

73

(1962 ed.).

7. See Hamilton, Race and Education: A Search for Legitimacy, in
187 (HARV. Eouc. R.Ev. ed. 1969).

TIONAL OPPORTUNITY

8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

EQUAL EDUCA-
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equal-educational-opportunity standard in light of the debate over
control, and stressing the difficulties that the courts will encounter
in coping with these matters.
I. THE

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEST

Men journey together with a view to particular advantage, and by
way of providing some particular thing needed for the purposes of
life, and similarly the political association seems to have come together originally, and to continue in existence, for the sake of the
general advantages it brings.9

At least since The Federalist Papers articulated a theory of governance, most American political philosophy has viewed particularistic groups-communities and factions generally-with alarm, and
has stressed the need to curb the "effects of ~he unsteadiness and
injustice [with] which a factious spirit tainted our public administration" by "break[ing] and control[ling] the violence of faction." 10
The traditional American philosophy has therefore advocated a
movement of the level of deliberation and the locus of power away
from the small, and presumably parochial, group to the larger universal community-toward "secularism, rationality, and universalism and against tradition, ritual, and community."11 If any lesser
community merited recognition, according to this view, it was only
the "community of limited liability"12-a self-formed community
limited in scope and function, created by the volitional acts of individuals, fluid enough to permit its members to come and go as
they choose, and yet sufficiently narrowly defined both to permit individuals to belong to several seemingly inconsistent "communities"
(a progressive day school for the children, a traditional suburb for
the family) and to protect those choices. The form of government
best suited to protecting "universal" interests was, of course, a representative republic governing a large area, not a pure democracy for
a geographically limited region. Even the political pluralists, who
have recognized the importance of factions in influencing political
decisions, focused their attention on general issues and advocated
system-wide, rather than faction-wide or community-wide, resolution
of those issues. 13
9. ArusroTLE, ETHICS 8. 9. 1160a (M. Ostwald ed. 1962).
IO. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-78 (E. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
11. Fein, supra note 1, at 89.
12. S. GREER, THE EMERGING CITY! MYTH AND REALITY 107-37 (1962).
13. See, e.g., R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN .AMERICAN CITY
(1961).
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For several reasons, current advocates of community control take
issue with these conventional political and social assumptions. They
find them unresponsive to the individual's need to exercise control
over his own environment. More pertinently, they regard them as
incompatible with the need of small groups to determine their fate
collectively. As Robert Nisbet puts the point:
To create the conditions within which autonomous individuals
could prosper, could be emancipated from binding ties of kinship,
class, and community, was the objective of the older laissez faire. To
create conditions within which autonomous groups may prosper
must be, I believe, the prime objective of the new laissez faire. 14
Community control advocates regard the traditional philosophical
assumptions as inconsistent with the American historical record,
which reveals both a series of de facto grants of power to those who
already hold power in other political areas and a relegation of the
less well-situated to the unhelpful care of the state and city. Furthermore, they see in the centralization of power and control an effort
to exploit--economically, culturally, and politically-the smaller
communities for the advantage of the larger, rather than any attempt
at universalistic conflict resolution.15 Milton Kotler has noted that
[nJeighborhood government moves toward territorial public power
as the basis of creating new social institutions. Furthermore, having
government authority is more fundamental to changing social conditions than having a vital economic role.
The strategy of white liberal politics is the opposite; it aims to increase its political power through its economic role.16
The community control advocates would substitute not the community of limited liability, with its stress on individual choice, but
the "diffuse organic community, based as much on mystique as on
reason, acting as a primary group to its members, speaking a private
tongue."17 Such a community would be based on "territorial facts
•.. commonly shared."18 The larger government would intrude only
14. NISBET, supra note 6, at 278.
15. There exists economic support for the community control approach:
••• there is a case for a separate governmental institution for each ghetto, whenever group differences in taste for collective goods are important and the patterns of
segregation in housing are not amenable to change. The collective goods then have
relatively well-defined boundaries given by the boundaries of the ghetto, and governmental institutions which conform to these boundaries are a necessary condition
for Pareto OJltimal provision of public services.
Olsen, Strategic Theory and Its Applications, AM. Ee. R.Ev., May 1969, at 479, 484.
16. M. KOTLER, NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT 92 (1969).
17. Fein, supra note 1, at 92-93.
18. Kon.ER, supra note 16, at 64, 65.
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to provide needed resources. Central to the existence of this kind of
community is its claim of authority to govern local matters:
A claim of political authority emanates from lengthy community
consideration of the many public issues that can cause people distress, until they realize that local problems are caused by bad laws,
and can be solved only when the community is empowered to make
its own laws.19
Seen in this perspective, the call for community controlled
schools is but one aspect of a broader set of demands for community
control over governance.20 These demands pose another set of problems. Kotler, for example, appears to assume that the state will be
willing, or at least can be coerced, to provide resources to the community, while divesting itself of control over those resources-an
assumption of doubtful political merit. Even more problematic is
the community control supporters' assumption that there exist substantial communities capable of agreeing among themselves on priorities and policies. The American black community is not so
united. It is split both regionally and philosophically between two
poles of assimilation and control, and this division makes common
policy difficult to attain. Such divisions indicate the necessity of constructing arrangements that will enable communities to make choices
without destroying the rights of individuals. As Rousseau so magnificently phrased the point, the task is "to find a form of association
which will defend and protect with the whole common force the
person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting
himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free
as before."21
This is not the sort of dilemma traditionally put to judicial resolution. It involves basic social choices more typically left to the legislature. But in Brown v. Board of Education,22 the Supreme Court
formulated a constitutional requirement of equal educational opportunity. Inasmuch as certain aspects of community control may
19. Id. at 73-74.
20. This tension has its roots in classical sociology, most prominently in Ferdinand
Tonnies' discussion of Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (usually translated
a5 society, and describing "a special type of human relationship: one characterized by
a high degree of individualism, impersonality, contractualism, and proceeding from volition or sheer interest rather than from the complex of affective states, habits, and
traditions that underlies Gemeinschaft."). R. NISBEI', THE SOCIOLOGICAL TRADITION 74
(1966). Chapter three of The Sodological Tradition is the primary source of this
discussion; it offers a most helpful analysis of "community" in classical sociological
literature.
21. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CoNTRAcr AND DISCOURSFS 13 (G. Cole ed. 1950).
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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be thought to conflict with that requirement, the burden of appraising these basic social issues is thrust upon the courts. The courts
do not have to determine whether any particular proposal is "good"
or "bad," but they do have to determine whether it is constitutionally permissible. Unfortunately, one effect of Brown and its
progeny is that the distinction between those two questions has become blurred, if not entirely erased. As a result, the decision which
was necessary to protect minority interests may have the unintended
effect of making impermissible some changes in educational systems
which would, if permitted, further advance those same minority interests. It is therefore necessary to examine the application of constitutional considerations to the establishment of effective forms of
community control.

!I. Is

COMMUNITY CONTROL CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE?

In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.23
In Brown v. Board of Education the Supreme Court declared
that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal" and
deprive Negro children of equal educational opportunities.24 The
scope of the resulting "equal opportunity" principle remains ambiguous. Brown may be read in a number of ways, some of which
cast doubt on the constitutionality of an approach, such as community control, which moves away from desegregation by affording
status and legitimacy to racially defined communities.25
The narrowest reading of Brown bars only that segregation based
explicitly on race. Such de jure segregation had been in force in
the Southern and border states represented by the defendants in
Brown. But is the ambit of the decision limited to Southern school
desegregation? Was it the explicitness of Southern segregation or
the very existence of segregation, in the North or South, that troubled the Court?
The way in which Brown is interpreted has important implications for community control. If the Court meant to dismantle those
23. 347 U.S. at 493.
24. 347 U.S. at 495.
25. This discussion assumes that decentralized districts will be relatively homo•
gcncous in racial and social make-up-an assumption based on the experience of those
cities in which control has thus far been an issue. Of course, there may be instances in
which small heterogeneous communities demand the opportunity to run their own
schools. Such a demand, however, would raise none of these constitutional questions.
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dual educational systems which had previously existed through force
of law, other forms of racial isolation-including, presumably, community control-are not proscribed.26 If, on the other hand, the
Court felt that racial segregation was constitutionally repugnant
whether or not mandated by law, Brown makes integration an affirmative constitutional requirement.
While the debate about Brown has most frequently centered on
whether de facto, as well as de jure, segregation is unconstitutional,
two other elements of that decision merit attention in considering
the constitutionality of community control. The segregation condemned in Brown was involuntary; the plaintiffs had been given no
choice but to send their children to an all-black school. By striking
down this restriction of individual choice, Brown clearly upholds
the right of free association of individuals against irrational state
curbs on that right. In that respect, it is less a case concerned with
education than a pronouncement about general public behavior. If
the Brown Court's focus on uncoerced association is significant, it
might enable a court to accept a community control arrangement
which coupled neighborhood-run schools with a provision permitting children to opt for an integrated education outside the neighborhood.27
The Supreme Court in Brown also noted the adverse effect of
segregation on the quality of education afforded black children, suggesting that integration was not regarded as an end valued in itself,
but as a means of ensuring equal educational outcomes. Such a
reading of the case leaves extant the possibility that plausible alternatives to desegregation as means of promoting equality-such as
community control-would be acceptable.
The Brown Court focused on no single element of segregation
as the basis of its proscription. In Brown the Court appears to have
posited integration, uncoerced association, and racially equal educational outcomes as aspects of the same end. Today that assumption
lacks validity: racial integration by itself will not ensure free association or equalize educational outcomes. Moreover, the value of integration has been called into question by those who renounce
racially heterogeneous schooling in favor of community control,
asserting the inadequacy of any other solution. In light of the ambiguous legal doctrine, and in light of new questions of ideology, it
26. Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern
Problem, 58 Nw. U. L. REY. 157 (1963) suggests this interpretation.
27. It is important to realize that community controlled schools are different in
kind from the "freedom-of-choice" plans which the Supreme Court rejected in Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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seems appropriate to attempt to identify again the unconstitutional
aspects of segregation and to re-evaluate the means available for
remedying these fatal defects.
The dimensions of the problem vary enormously between the
North and the South, and even within different communities in each
region. The complexity of issues, whether viewed as legal conundrums or as regional fact patterns susceptible to differing understandings, augurs ill for any effort at unitary solution. In the South, the
courts continue to strive for an end to the dual system of schooling
which Brown clearly found unconstitutional.28 The push has been
slow and costly, both in terms of judicial energy and, more notably,
in terms of deferred educational promises. Southern school districts
have shmm considerable and lamentable ingenuity in evading
Brown. They put forth a :whole host of alternatives-such as massive
resistance, freedom-of-choice plans, neighborhood schools (where
neighberhoods were residentially segregated), and tuition-voucher
schemes-which effectively retained segregation under various
guises. 29 The Snopes-like recurrence of the leading Southern casesGriffin v. State Board of Education,30 Poindexter v. Louisiana Finance Assistance Commission,31 United States v. Jefferson County
Board of Education,32 Goss v. Board of Education,33 and Brewer v.
Norfolk School Board34-attests to the extent of the evasion.85 The
28. There is a vast difference in the history of public education between the South
and the North. See R. BUTis &: L. CREMIN, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN AME.RICAN CULTURE 250 (1956). The South has never had common schools as such. Almost from the
first, public schools were racially separate enterprises. In Louisiana, for example, the
legislature enacted the first public school act in 1847. It provided at least three years
schooling for "any youth (white, of course) under 21." E. FAY, THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN LouISIANA 69 (1898). Despite the Supreme Court's mandate in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), that separate facilities had to be "equal," black schools were never
equal to white schools. Less money was spent for buildings, teachers, and materials in
black schools; those schools were open fewer days of the year; and they offered more
limited training. Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and Equal Protection, in EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 139, 151 (HARV. EDuc. REv. ed. 1969).
29. See, e.g., Louisiana Fin. Assistance Commn. v. Poindexter, 389 U.S. 571 (1968);
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 390 U.S.
936 (1968).
30. 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969).
31. 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), afjd., 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
32. 417 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1969).
33. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
34. Brewer v. Norfolk School Bd., 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968); remand, Beckett v.
Norfolk School Bd., 302 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Va.), rehearing, 308 F. Supp. 1274 (E.D. Va.
1969).
35. Cf. Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 849 (5th Cir. 1967). "This
court has had to deal with a variety of reasons that school boards have managed to
dredge up to rationailze their denial of the constitutional right of Negro schoolchildren
to equal educational opportunities with white children. This case presents a new and
bizarre excuse••••" Oudge Wisdom).
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dismantling of the Southern dual educational system will presum•
ably be hastened by the Supreme Court's recent insistence that
schools must desegregate "at once."36 The Southern black community continues to press for a single system of public schools and an
end to the vestiges of separate and inferior education.
In the South, therefore, community control seems both an un. likely demand for the black community to make and, at least until
the dismantling of separate schools has been fully accomplished, of
doubtful constitutionality.37 The essence of Southern segregation is
domination: the imposition of a separate system of schools upon the
black community, against the will of its leaders, unaccompanied by
any transfer of power or control. Under such a system, choice is a
chimera, rightly and forcefully condemned by the courts.38 Community control is a quite different, indeed antithetical, notion. It
connotes an active choice of dominion over the community's schools
by a group which defines itself as a community for the purpose of
making the choice. The concept of community control further
implies a transfer of significant power to the community in order to
make meaningful the exercise of control. Advocates of community
control argue that equal educational opportunity can be achieved
through means other than integration, that the opportunity for a
parent to exercise _real and direct influence over his children's education-to be able to hold the school accountable for its failurescarries with it educational benefits.39 It is segregation without choice
36. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
37. "The [school] board's duty is not discharged until the all-Negro schools in the
system are done away with••••" United States v. Choctaw County Bd. of Educ., 417
F.2d 838, 839 (5th Cir. 1969).
38. See, e.g., Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 686 (1963). "The right of transfer
••• is a one way ticket leading to but one destination, i.e., the majority race of the
transferee and continued segregation." See also Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430 (1968); Goss v. Board of Educ., 406 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1969); Walker v. County
School Bd., 413 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1969); Davis v. Board of School Commrs., 414 F.2d
609 (5th Cir. 1969); Jackson v. Marvell School Dist., 416 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Lovett, 416 F.2d 801, 807 (5th Cir. 1969) ("state-imposed segregation of the
races") (emphasis added); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 417 F.2d 834
(5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Choctaw County Bd. of Educ., 417 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1969).
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), is the clearest example of this imposition,
in a somewhat broader context. In Gomillion, the state legislature detached the predominantly black section of a city from the rest of the city and created a separate community, which had to provide its own public services. The Court overturned the
separation, noting that
the essential inevitable effect of this redefinition of Tuskegee's boundaries is to
remove from the city all save only four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not
removing a single white voter or resident. The result of this Act is to deprive the
Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the benefits of residence in Tuskegee, including inter alia, the right to vote in municipal elections.
364 U.S. at 341.
39. Hamilton, Race and Education: A. Search for Legitimacy, 38 HARv. Eouc. REv.
669, 681-84 (1968).
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or control that Southern schoolmen have proffered and black leaders
oppose, and the Southern black community has thus far been disinclined to propose the very different separation implicit in community control. Moreover, in order to eliminate state-imposed segregation, federal courts in the South have found it necessary to strike
down all proposed alternatives to desegregation that would have
operated to maintain the status quo.40 Until the vestiges of the dual
school system are abandoned, courts are unlikely to embrace community control where communities are racially and socially defined. 41
In the North, on the other hand, black leaders have come to
regard community control of schools as the most promising means of
securing educational equality.42 Certain of the educational ends
that they seek are similar to those sought by the integrationists:
schools that can succeed in teaching basic cognitive skills, such as
reading and ciphering, to poor and black school children; schools
that can prepare children to cope with life in a. complex and too
often hostile environment. Community control advocates argue
either that integration has not worked, or, more typically, that the
political will to attempt it has been lacking. 43 As a result, they contend, continuing reliance on integration as a means for achieving
the desired educational ends no longer seems appropriate.44 Rather,
in their view, control, and the educational, psychological, and political benefits that assertedly follow from such control, is a preferable
means.
Judicial insistence that Southern schools integrate "at once,"45
coupled with the increasing willingness of Northern courts to identify racially motivated practices of city school boards as illegitimate,46 makes evident the potential conflict between community
control in the North and the Brown rule. The conflict may be
simply put: decentralization promotes racial isolation; Brown inveighs against it. If Brown is read to disallow all racial separation,
community control will be found to be unconstitutional; and no
40. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Louisiana Fin. Assistance Commn. v. Poindexter, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
41. Cf. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts,
78 HARv. L. REv. 564, 610 (1965): where a community is " .•. politically impotent or
deliberately excluded from the political process ••• the appeal inherent in a negotiated
resolution of competing interests is lacking.••."
42. Hamilton, supra note 39, at 670-76.
43. See Cohen, The Price of Community Control, COMMENTARY, July 1969, at 23.
44. Id.
45. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
46. See text accompanying notes 71-80 infra.
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expression favoring separateness, even if made by the majority of a
black community, will be able to cure the constitutional defect.47
Yet that reading of Brown seems overly mechanical and is peculiarly unresponsive to different factual contexts and to the educational consequences of alternative arrangements.48 It also fuses two
elements of the decision that merit separate analysis: Brown's concern with educational consequences, and its concern with associational consequences.
In Brown the Court explicitly framed its ruling in terms of educational outcomes, citing the effect of segregated schooling on black
children.49 This effect presumably would have existed whether segregation had come about adventitiously or through force of law. In the
intervening fifteen years, the educational evidence has changed.ISO
Furthermore, Northern federal courts have generally been unwilling to cast the rights of black school children in substantive educational terms. 51
The Brown Court apparently assumed that racial isolation causes
racially different outcomes and that racial integration will yield
racially identical results. Current social-science evidence drastically
qualifies that assumption. It suggests that race has only a modest
effect on schooling success and that social-class integration is more
47. This is analogous to the position that the Supreme Court has taken with
respect to the "one man-one vote" constitutional standard. In a case arising from
Colorado, the Court concluded that the electorate's approval of a legislative-apportionment plan which varied from the "one man-one vote" standard was irrelevant in determining the plan's constitutionality once a dissident minority had challenged that plan.
An individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote
cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority of a state's electorate, if the apportionment scheme adopted by the voters fails to measure up to the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause•.•• A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be
infringed simply because a majority of people choose that it be.
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964). The case is particularly interesting because a majority of voters in every county in the state approved
the challenged apportionment scheme.
48. Cf. Fiss, supra note 41, at 608,
49. Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. • • • A sense of inferiority affects the motivation
of the child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of the law, therefore, has a
tendency to retard the educational and mental development of Negro children and
to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated
school system. Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority.
347 U.S. at 494.
50. See, e.g., UNITED STATES CoMMN. ON CIVIL RlGHI'S, RACIAL lsOLATION IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967); EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (HARV. Enuc. R.Ev. ed. 1969).
51. The rejection of the justiciability of the "educational-needs" concept is the
clearest example of this judicial unwillingness. See McGinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp.
327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), afjd. sub nom., McGinnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Burrus v.
Wilkerson, 801 F. Supp. 1237 (W.D. Va. 1969), afjd., 397 U.S. 44 (1970).

Community Control

June 1970]

1367

likely than is racial integration to lead to significant educational
benefits for poor and black school children.52 Even more important,
the limitations of the evidence from social science are also more
plain today. The research commends no single strategy as likely to
produce educational equality, no strategy likely to overcome the
nonschool differentials that find their way into outcomes measured
by reading and arithmetic comprehension tests. In short, equality
of educational outcomes-the most significant measure of opportunity to the children primarily affected-appears unattainable by
any single pattern of educational intervention. There are a variety
of alternative educational approaches. These include compensatoryeducation programs, such as those established by title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act,53 which would provide
added educational resources to disadvantaged children; the establishment of metropolitan school districts, which would foster race and
class heterogeneity; and the use of tuition vouchers, which would
promote educational choice by permitting students to enroll in private or public schools.54 The effectiveness of such programs remains
for the most part undetermined.
In the face of such an educational dilemma, the Court would be
unwise to equate equality of educational opportunity-the constitutional standard-with equality of educational outcome; exhortations
to do the impossible do not make good law.55 For the community
control advocate, this seems fortunate, since the evidence suggesting
the educational efficacy of community control is slim indeed.56
While there is substantial rhetoric to the contrary, little data exists
which indicates that community control alone, without substantial
infusions of dollars and resources, would significantly change educational outcomes. The notion of community control is at its heart a
political statement, equally appropriate in the context of police or
fire protection. But that often camouflaged fact should not in itself
make community control any less acceptable to the courts; few contrary educational assertions carry much empirical weight.
52. See, e.g., U.S. NATL. CENTER FOR EDuc. STATisncs, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
Coleman ed. 1966); EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY {HARV, Eouc.
REv. ed. 1969).
53. 20 U.S.C. §§ 241 a-m (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
54. See Jencks, ls the Public School Obsolete?, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1966,
at 23-24.
55. Cf. Lon Fuller's discussion of the "morality of aspiration" in THE :MORALITY oF
LAw 5 (1964).
56. See Pettigrew, Race and Equal Educational Opportunity, in EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 69 {HARV. EDuc. REv. ed. 1969); Cohen, The Price of Community
Control, COMMENTARY, July 1969, at 2!!.
OPPORTUNITY
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Northern federal courts have dealt with school segregation in
different ways. During the 1960's, they were generally unwilling to
order school boards to overcome harm assertedly caused by adventitious de facto segregation. 57 While one federal district court declared that "there must be no segregated schools," 58 three federal
courts of appeal read Brown as prohibiting only de jure school segregation. 59 In so doing, the courts focused not on the educational consequences of segregation, but rather on its associational consequences.
In Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 60 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit provided the clearest explication of this position. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that
they were constitutionally entitled to a remedy for the educational
harm done to black children by requiring them, through adherence
to a neighborhood school policy, to attend predominantly black
schools. It viewed the wrong addressed in Brown not in terms of educational damage, but as an arbitrary racial classification proscribed
by the equal protection clause:
The essence of the Brown decision was that the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow the state to classify its citizens differently solely
because of their race. While the detrimental impact of compulsory
segregation on the children of the minority race was referred to by
57. Paradoxically, the factual basis for finding discriminatory intent seems strongest
in Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), affd., 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 877 U.S. 924 (1964), the leading case rejecting the principle that de
facto segregation is unconstitutional. In Gary, schools had been formally segregated, as
authorized by Indiana state law, until 1948. In 1953, the school board explained that a
school boundary which created an all-black school had been adopted because "it is not
considered good for children of a closely knit community, such as the [overwhelmingly
black] Project, to attend different schools." 213 F. Supp. at 823-24. Other decisions by
the board concerning districting and school construction suggest similar racial motiva•
tion. See Kaplan, Segregation, Litigation and the Schools-Part III: The Gary Litigation,
59 Nw. U. L. REV. 121 (1965).
In contrast, Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed
as premature, 288 F.2d 600 (2d Cir.), remedy considered on rehearing, 195 F. Supp. 231
(S.D.N.Y.), affd., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961), found and pro•
scribed de jure segregation on far slimmer factual grounds: hearsay evidence that district lines had been gerrymandered in 1930, and a policy-terminated in 1949-of permitting whites to transfer out of a predominantly black school.
58. Barksdale v. School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543, 547 (Mass.), revd. on other
grounds, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). See also Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp.
208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962);
Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 875, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606
(1963) (dictum).
59. See, e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 244 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Ohio), affd., 369
F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849 (1967); Bell v. School City of Gary,
213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), affd., 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
924 (1964); Downs v. Kansas City, 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
914 (1965).
60. 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966).
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the Court, it was not indispensable to the decision. Rather, the
Court held that segregation of the races was an arbitrary exercise
of governmental power inconsistent with the requirements of the
Constitution.61

The Deal court regarded choice, unconstrained by "irrelevant barriers,"62 as crucial to the Supreme Court's holding in Brown: "The
element of inequality in Brown was the unnecessary restriction of
freedom of choice for the individual based on the fortuitous, uncontrollable, arbitrary factor of his race." 63
Unconstrained freedom of association is, at first blush, an arrestingly attractive judicial concept. It falls within the ambit of traditional equal protection decisions; 64 and it removes the court from
the troublesome business of reviewing discretionary acts, such as
adherence to a neighborhood school policy, for which some educational justification can be shmvn. Indeed, it is "choice" that community control advocates favor in arguing that certain self-defined
communities have a right to manage their own educational affairs.
Yet where the self-selected community is predominately black
(or Puerto Rican or Mexican-American), the exercise of choice may
yield constitutionally troubling consequences. The clear teaching of
Green v. County School Board65 is that a politically dominant white
community cannot opt for a nominally free-choice arrangement
which in fact excludes black students from formerly all-white
schools.66 Does community control, insofar as it promotes racially
identifiable communities, fall within the category of discriminatory
association condemned by Brown and Green? The question is more
sharply posed in the context of a hypothetical lawsuit, brought by a
black parent, challenging a community control arrangement on the
grounds that the effect of such an arrangement is to deny his children the opportunity to associate with white school children. If the
community is indeed racially defined, and if the arrangement offers
the parent no option but to send his child to the neighborhood
(and black) school, the parent's argument is appealing: his children
do not have the chance to go to school with white children; and
61. 369 F.2d at 58-59 (emphasis added).
62. 369 F .2d at 59.
63. 369 F.2d at 60.
64. See, e.g., Tussman &: tenBrook, Equal Protection of the Law, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341 (1949).
65. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
66. "Implicit in Brown's condemnation of governmentally imposed segregation is
the judgment that the satisfaction of discriminatory associational desires is not a legitimate government function where the result is segregated education." Fiss, supra note
41, at 575 n.7.
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the source of that denial is the official policy of the school board,
not just the happenstance of residence.
Certainly, there are differences between the rationale that
prompts community control and the rationale for other forms of
segregated schooling. But the effect is the same-state-promoted
racial isolation. The remedy in such a situation, however, is not
necessarily that community control be struck down in its entirety.
If unconstrained choice is the value to be conserved, the parent's
concern extends only to his children and to the class of children in
the community who are prevented by the community control plan
from attending integrated schools. If the arrangement were structured in such a manner as to attend, at public expense, a school
in which his race is a minority, this constraint on choice would be
removed. The arrangement might then, and only then, be constitutionally acceptable. 67 The constitutional question has not, however,
been posed to the courts in this form. Decisions striking down
freedom-of-choice plans in the South assumed, quite rightly, that
freedom of choice in that context was but a subterfuge to avoid disestablishing the dual educational system. Yet where such a system
has not previously existed (and Deal,68 Bell,69 and Downs10 all suggest that this is the conventional judicial understanding of many
Northern school situations), freedom of choice for the integrationminded, predicated on the wishes of the black community, might
well be permissible.
But discussions of constitutional possibility do not foreclose
the educational problems. Coupling community control with a
"majority-to-minority transfer" provision places the burden of choosing an integrated education on the parent, rather than on the state;
in so doing it implies that communitarianism is to be regarded as
the norm and integration as the exception. Furthermore, it subjects
the parent who prefers an integrated education for his children to
considerable community pressure. Whether the burden and the
pressure ought to rest with the integration-minded parent is a
dilemma not easily resolved.
These problems have become even more important in light of
67. The "majority-to-minority transfer" provision has in fact been adopted by
numerous Southern school boards which are under desegregation orders. See, e.g.,
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970).
68. 244 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Ohio), affd., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 849 (1967).
69. 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), affd., 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 924 (1964).
70. 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965).
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recent litigation concerning segregation in the North.71 These cases
reject the presumption that Northern school segregation is the
result of factors outside the control of the school board. They indicate a willingness on the part of the courts to examine the intent
of local school boards and to identify and to proscribe deliberate
segregation resulting from district line drawing, busing, construction, and teacher and student assignment practices. The facts of
United States v. School District 151 of Cook County clearly support
a finding of intentional segregation.72 White students were bused
long distances, past predominantly black schools, in order to enable
them to attend all-white schools; black students were denied similar
opportunities. In addition, school construction was planned to maintain an all-Negro school, and no black teachers were assigned to the
predominantly white schools until 1967. The district, in short,
maintained segregated schools as completely and as purposefully as
did many Southern school districts. In such a situation, no remedy
short of disestablishment would have been appropriate. Furthermore, in two very recent cases, Davis v. School District of the City
of Pontiac73 and Crawford v. Board of Education,74 segregation in
Pontiac, Michigan, and in Los Angeles, California, was declared unconstitutional without the clear showing of discriminatory intent
which was made in the Cook County decision. The school boards in
both cases had maintained a neighborhood school policy which assertedly took into consideration only proximity and safety factors in
setting attendance zones and in building new schools. But such a
policy, the Davis court suggested, did not absolve the board of responsibility for the segregation that resulted. Intent, the court said,
is to be inferred when the local school board has unnecessarily
perpetuated a segregated system:
This Court finds that the Pontiac Board of Education intentionally utilized the power at their [sic] disposal to locate new schools
and arrange boundaries in such a way as to perpetuate the pattern
of segregation within the City and, thereby, deliberately, in contradiction of their announced policies of achieving a racial mixture
in the schools, prevented integration. Where the power to act is
71. See, e.g., United States v. School Dist. 151 of Cook County, 404 F.2d 1125 {7th Cir.
1969); Davis v. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970) {Pontiac); Crawford v.
Board of Educ., Civil No. 822854 {Los Angeles Super. Ct., May 18, 1970); :Berry v.
School Dist., Civil No. 9 (W.D. Mich., Feb. 17, 1970) {:Benton Harbor, Michigan); Keyes
v. School Dist., Civil No. C-1499 (D. Colo., May 21, 1970) (Denver). See also Taylor v.
Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
72. 404 F.2d 1125 {7th Cir. 1969).
73. 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
74. Civil No. 822854 {Los Angeles Super. Ct., May 18, 1970) (unpub. opinion).
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available, failure to take the necessary steps so as to negate or alleviate a situation which is harmful is as ·wrong as is the taking of
affirmative steps to advance that situation. . . . Where a Board of
Education has contributed and played a major role in the develop•
ment and growth of a segregated situation, the Board is guilty of
de jure segregation.15

These decisions suggest that many heretofore unchallenged
school board policies will be unacceptable where those policies serve
to promote or to perpetuate racially isolated schools. They do not,
however, establish a judicial policy concerning community control.
The distinction between control and the proscribed policies is significant: where city boards have adjusted boundaries or assigned
teachers, with racially predictable consequences, they have done so
without the consent of the communities primarily affected; furthermore, no transfer of power has accompanied the provision of racially
differentiated services. That distinction should permit a court to
uphold a community control scheme while refusing to sanction
racially motivated actions undertaken by a city-wide school board.
It is here that the rationales underlying the Davis and Crawford
decisions diverge. While both cases proscribed segregated schooling,
Davis based that conclusion on a finding of intentional de jure
segregation. The Davis court was careful to acknowledge "that a
Board of Education has no affirmative duty to eliminate segregation
when it has done nothing to create it. . . ." 76 The court found,
however, that the Pontiac Board had in fact "created" segregation
through an ostensibly color-blind neighborhood school policy. The
court in Crawford was much more outspoken in its belief in integrated education for all schoolchildren. Although the court found
that there was intentional segregation in Los Angeles, it dismissed
the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, concluding
that the harm done to black children was the same in both cases,
and that the school board's duty to provide integrated education
was an affirmative constitutional obligation. The court stated:
75. 309 F. Supp. at 741-42. Cf. Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150, 153
(E.D.N.Y. 1962):
Education is compulsory in New York... ; those for whom education is compulsory
by reason of theu- age are unqualifiedly entitled to attend the public schools of
their residence ..• ; ••. taxation for support of the schools is mandatory••••
The educational system that is thus compulsory and publicly afforded must deal
·with the inadequacy arising from adventitious segregation; it cannot accept any
indurate segregation on the ground that it is not coerced or planned but accepted.
In Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, remedy considered on rehearing,
229 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1964), the court rejected the argument that the Negro
plaintiffs have "chosen" segregation by volunteering to live in one neighborhood, noting
the obvious economic disparity between Negro and white neighborhoods.
76. 309 F. Supp. at 742.
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Segregation of children in public schools deprives the children of
the minority group of equal educational opportunities and this irrespective of whether the segregation be described or classified as
de facto or de jure.
The labelling of segregation as de jure or de facto does not change
the fact of segregation. Each is merely a legal designation, a legal
handle in the formulation of duties. The duty to grant and give
all students, including the minority students, equal educational opportunity, is affirmative, the counterpart of depriving by prohibiting.
It is practically impossible, in the creation and maintenance of
neighborhood schools, and the mandating of attendance thereat,
which are in fact segregated, said schools being created and maintained by tax money, to have only de facto segregation.77

The Crawford opinion makes explicit its reliance on psychological
evidence which demonstrates the benefit of integrated education
for all schoolchildren; it concludes that segregation impairs the
confidence of black and Mexican-American children and restricts
their aspirations. 78 In this instance, the court's argument rests on
shaky educational grounds: it is far from clear that racially isolated
schools cannot develop the same self-assurance and the same sense of
control over one's own destiny that are promoted by nominally
integrated schools.79 It is not even clear that integration promotes
such a sense of control. Crawford has in effect adopted a social
policy: that the aim of schools is to acculturate all children-to
assimilate them into "the mainstream of American society."80 That
policy does not enjoy universal acceptance, either by the white
77. Crawford v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 822854 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., May 18,
1970) at 26, 85-86 (unpub. opinion).
78. Negro and Mexican children suffer serious harm when their education takes

place in public schools which are racially segregated, whatever the source of such
segregation might be. Negro and Mexican children who attend predominantly
Negro or Mexican schools do not achieve as well as other children-Negro, Mexican and 'White in integrated schools. Their aspirations become more restricted than
t11ose of other children. They do not have as much confidence that they can influence their own futures. When they become adults they are less likely to participate
in the mainstream of Anlerican society, and more likely to fear, dislike and avoid
white Americans. It "affects their hearts and minds in ways unlikely ever to be
undone." ••• The harm results not alone from the deprival of equal educational
opportunity, but additionally in the attitudes which such segregation generates
and the effect of those attitudes upon motivation to learn and achieve.
Crawford v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 822854 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., May 18, 1970)
at 2!!-24 (unpub. opinion).
79. Many ostensibly integrated schools continue to group students by track or tested
ability, thereby effectively isolating black students from the rest of the school. Such
tracking recreates segregation and raises constitutional problems which are beyond the
scope of this Article. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), afld. sub
nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1969).
80. Crawford v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 822854 (Los Angeles Super. Ct., May 18,
1970) at 23 (unpub. opinion).
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community or by the minority communities that will supposedly
benefit from the Crawford decision. It has little to do with educational consequences but much to do with social intermeddling, and
for that reason it seems unfortunate. To require full integration
as the only constitutionally acceptable system of education is both
unrealistic and unwise. It would make substantially more sense for
courts to adopt the rationale of the Cook County and Davis cases,
employing the concept of intentional de jure segregation to strike
down school board policies which impose racially segregated schools
on nonconsenting individuals, without barring such alternative approaches to equal educational opportunity as community control.
Prediction is difficult in an area of the law as complex as equality
of educational opportunity. It does, however, seem urJikely that
the Supreme Court, when finally faced with the question, will conclude that integration is an affirmative constitutional right for all
children. The factual situations are too diverse, the competing ends
-notably, racially and socially heterogeneous schooling versus
the maintenance of the unhampered right of association-too irresolvable to warrant such a mechanical solution. Thus, while Northern
as well as Southern school boards may find themselves increasingly
unable to maintain racially separated schools through an assortment of "neutral" building practices, attendance zoning, or teacher
assignment practices, substantial community control-with community consent and the transfer of power over education-should
be deemed constitutionally permissible.

!II. Is

COMMUNITY CONTROL CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED?

Those unsatisfied with the responses of state and city officials
to appeals for decentralized schools have lately taken their case to
the courts and have asserted a constitutional right to community
controlled schools. In the midst of New York's school crisis, one
community group in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville section of New
York City claimed the right to determine the experimental school
district's policies and to hire and fire teachers and principals.81
In Boston, several black plaintiffs demanded that the city school
board be elected by area, rather than on a city-wide basis, in order
to ensure the election of at least one black school board member
to the five-member board; as an alternative remedy, the plaintiffs
proposed the division of the city into self-governing districts.82 While
81. Oliver v. Donovan, 293 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
82. Owens v. School Comm., 304 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mass. 1969).
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these cases are nominally couched in constitutional terms, they
actually represent unresolved political disagreements over who should
control the schools. Community control advocates have thus far been
unsuccessful in obtaining judicial relief. Courts, without legislative
guidance, have refused to become too deeply involved in the struggle
over the power to determine educational policy.
Those who would make community control a constitutional
right develop two quite different arguments. The first, relied on in
the New York litigation, insists that only through control can equal
educational opportunity be achieved, since any other form of school
governance inevitably disadvantages poor and black children.88 The
second, the basis of the Boston litigation, draws on the reapportionment decisions84 to establish for groups of like-minded individuals
the general right to manage their own political affairs and the
specific right to manage their mvn schools.85
The argument equating decentralization with equal opportunity
for poor and black children reflects the disillusionment of the black
community with earlier efforts at securing quality education, notably
through busing black children to white schools and developing
"magnet schools" to draw children from all parts of the city. For a
variety of reasons, the most significant of which were minimal financial support and insufficient political force, those measures proved
less than adequate to meet the needs of the affected communities.86
On the basis of that particular educational and political failure,
plaintiffs in the New York case, Oliver v. Donovan,81 asserted that
any educational effort managed by the city-wide board would inevitably harm poor and black urban school children. In a subsequent suit, arguing for the right of the experimental school districts
to survive a city-wide redistricting, New York community groups
presented the view that
[a]s a result of the past history of educational deprivation out of
which the demonstration projects grew, the immediate design of
this present plan to eliminate the demonstration projects [described
elsewhere in the complaint as "an attempt by the governmental
agencies of the state to return members of the nonwhite communities
83. I.S. 201 Complex Demonstration Project Governing Bd. v. Board of Educ., Civil
No. 69C-5919 (S.D.N.Y., May 4, 1970) (unreported).
84. See, e.g., Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969), prob. juris.
noted, 397 U.S. 984 (1970). See discussion in text accompanying notes 105-14 infra.
85. Owens v. School Comm., 304 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mass. 1969).
86. See Count 1 in the Complaint, I.S. 201 Complex Demonstration Project Governing Bd. v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 69C-5919 (S.D.N.Y., May 4, 1970) (unreported).
87. 293 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Plaintiffs in Oliver included the governing
boards of two of the city's three experimental community controlled districts.
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to a status inferior to that of white communities; i.e. 'to keep them
in their place,' in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment."] and
the ultimate effect of this plan £or the educational future of the nonwhite communities involved, the state's attempted withdrawal of
the community-controlled education experiments, and the education
benefits and experimental value inherent in those projects, violates the constitutional mandates of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.88
The argument is couched in terms of equal protection: when a
right is "fundamental" (and it is asserted that education is such a
right), state action which discriminates even unintentionally against
one group of citizens is unconstitutional unless that action is the
only way of furthering a legitimate state interest. School governance
is an example of this situation, since a city-wide school board, by
attempting to treat all children in the same fashion, benefits only
its middle-class constituency. Such differential consequences are
viewed as an inevitable concomitant of city-wide educational
governance. Furthermore, such centralized governance does not appear to further even such an arguably legitimate state concern as
socialization. The argument concludes that decentralization is the
only constitutional way to manage city schools, because only decentralization promotes more responsive and more effective urban education.89
This analysis may be considered an attempt to clothe in constitutional garb the policy notion that communities have an inherent
right to govern themselves. That position has undoubted political
appeal. It also finds some support in the historical record, at least
prior to the mid-nineteenth century. While Massachusetts recognized
as early as 1642 that "the great neglect of many parents and masters
in training their children in learning and labor, and other implyments which may be proffitable to the common wealth ..." 00 called
for colonial intervention, that intervention was, for almost two
hundred years, limited to statutes encouraging the local community
to provide some form of education.91 No guidelines were established;
88. Amended Complaint at 14, I.S. 201 Complex Demonstration Project Governing
Bd. v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 69C-5919 (S.D.N.Y., May 4, 1970) (unreported)
(emphasis added).
89. See Note, School Decentralization: Legal Paths to Local Control, 57 GEO. L.J. 992
(1969).
90. Mass. School of Law of 1642, in H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY
28 (7th ed. 1968).
91. Of course, the pattern of state responsibility differed from state to state. New
York was one of the first states to recognize the virtues of centralized public education.
The Southern states did not, for the most part, require public education until after the
Civil War. Few, if any, states provided substantial financial support for public schools.
See generally L. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOLS: AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION
91-125 (1951); B. BAILYN, EDUCATION lN THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1960).
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no requirements were set; and no aid was provided. The community
provided the initiative, determined who would attend school, chose
those who would teach in the schools; and decided what would be
taught. The ratification of the Federal Constitution did not alter
the pattern: none of the original thirteen states provided for education in their state constitutions. Indeed, by 1820 only thirteen of
the then twenty-three states made constitutional reference to education. 02 A decade later a Massachusetts educator, distinguishing
between public and private schools, noted that public schools "are
under the supervision of selected men, responsible more or less
directly to the community. The private schools have no supervision,
or only that of the parents.''93 Nothing in the debates of that time
indicates a much different role for the states. Indeed, it was not until
the middle of the nineteenth century that states established statewide boards of education and appointed state superintendents of
education, thereby making clear their concern with the efficiency
and quality of public schools.94
This historical evidence belies the notion that the state's exercise of dominion over education is both inevitable and irresistibly
correct. Yet, although the political and historical record is appealing, it makes a far from compelling legal argument. Courts have long
held that communities have no inherent legal right to "control"
their schools.95 In legal theory, at least, the state proposes and disposes with respect to public education, while local school districts
carry out the state's wishes.96
Well before community control of schools became a common
demand of Northern black communities, other groups resented the
checks placed on local authority by distant and seemingly unresponsive state legislatures. They asserted that education was of primary
concern to the community, not to the state, and should therefore
be controlled by the community. Courts have consistently rejected
such assertions. As the Indiana supreme court stated in an oftencited case:
Essentially and intrinsically the schools in which are educated and
trained the children who are to become the rulers of the common92, COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS, EDUCATION IN THE STATES: NATIONWIDE
DEVELOPMENT 135
Pearson &: E. Fuller eds. 1969).
93, L, CREMIN, THE .AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOLS: AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION 137
(1951).
94. EDUCATION IN THE STATES, supra note 92, at 75.
95. The cases are collected in E. BOLMIER, THE SCHOOL IN THE LEGAL STRUcrURE
(1968) and R. HAMILTON&: P. MORT, THE LAw AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1959).
96. Constitutions in every state except Connecticut require that the state maintain
free public schools; the Connecticut Constitution otherwise provides funds for public
schools. E. BoLMIER, supra note 95, at 65-67.
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wealth are matters of State, and not local jurisdiction. In such matters, the State is the unit, and the legislature the source of power.
The authority over schools . . . is a central power residing in the
Legislature of the State. It is for the law-making to determine whether
the authority shall be exercised by a State board of education, or
distributed to county, township, or city organization throughout the
state ....97
The "inherent right" argument relies more heavily on the asserted rights of certain groups than it does on the concerns of local
governmental units. Proponents of community control have focused
on black communities and have contended that, at least for black
people, control is a prerequisite to educational equality. They indict
the schools for failing to reach whole segments of the population,
for imprisoning rather than instructing school children,08 and for
creating a permanent underclass, unaware of its potential and doomed
to repeat the careers of its fathers. The increasing number of school
drop-outs is no longer thought to represent personal failure or
social-class differences, but rather is considered symptomatic of the
systemic breakdmvn of the public schools. Advocates of community
control argue that, in light of such a breakdown, they can do no
worse in running the schools. Indeed, they believe that they will be
able to do far better because of their more intimate knowledge of the
community's children and the problems which those children face.
A further level of argument deals with the failure of existing
school systems to impart to children a sense of control over their
own destinies. This argument derives empirical support from Equality of Educational Opportunity/19 a massive report on American
public education. The survey that was the basis for that report included several questions designed to measure "fate control"-the
degree to which children feel that their own efforts, rather than fate,
determine the course of their lives. The responses indicated a strik. ing correlation between an individual's sense of fate control and his
performance in school. Supporters of community control have relied
on this finding. They argue that community controlled schools will
give black students a sense that they can reconquer their surrendered
identity, and that this sense will in turn enable those students to
97. State v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 465, 23 N.E. 946, 947 (1890). For more recent
development of this point, see Fruit v. Metropolitan School Dist., 241 Ind. 621, 172
N.E.2d 864 (1961); Fort Wayne Community Schools v. State, 240 Ind. 57, 159 N.E.2d 708
(1959).
98. Death at an Early Age, the title of Jonathan Kozol's book, suggests a metaphor
more ominous than imprisonment.
99. U.S. NATL. CENTER FOR Enuc. STATISTICS, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY G· Coleman ed. 1966).
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succeed more regularly in what was formerly viewed as a hostile
and ego-defeating school environment.100
To argue that the failure of the present educational system makes
decentralization a constitutional requirement is to over-simplify a
vexing educational problem. While the argument obtains support
from commonly held misgivings about urban schooling, it proposes
as the only acceptable remedy what is in fact only one of several
alternative and competing choices. The consequences of each competing choice are not altogether clear. Even after numerous academic
skirmishes, no one really knows what pedagogic consequences will
follow from altering the method of school governance. Nor is it
self-evident that slackness in the central school administration bears
on or causes disasters in the classroom. Perhaps it does; but that
conclusion depends on speculations about human nature and political behavior, speculations not usually accorded constitutional recognition.
Other strategies for securing equal educational opportunity have
recently been proposed. State educational financing schemes have
been attacked on constitutional grounds in an attempt to prevent
states from making school support a function of community wealth,
and these attacks promise added dollars to presently impoverished
urban school systems. Two proposed remedies-district power equalizing and family power equalizing-would eliminate the effect of
wealth variations, while stressing the importance of local choice and
fiscal control.101 Power equalizing makes the quality of educational
services a function of effort-the result of how heavily the relevant
unit, whether district or family, chooses to tax itself for education.
It would enable any school district to determine at what rate it
wished to be taxed for education and to spend the amount that is
fixed by the state to correspond to the tax rate chosen. Each district
would have to make an equal effort to get equal dollars. Family
power equalizing operates on the same principle. The relevant unit
would be the family, rather than the school district; and the family's
choice would be reflected in a "tuition voucher" which the family
100. Community control advocates also see community-run schools as a way of
forcing the white establishment to take their demands seriously. Viewed in this way, the
community school becomes a power base in a very traditional sense-a mode of politicizing the black community and a ready source of jobs and patronage. See N. GLAZER &
D. MoYNllIAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (1963), which describes similar political forays
by other New York City minority groups.
101. See, e.g., Coons, Clune, 8: Sugarman, Educational opportunity: A Workable
Constitutional Test for State Financing Structures, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305 (1969); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through
the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAR.v. L. REv. 7 (1969).

1380

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:1355

could use to support any educational alternative, public or private,
that it chose.
Power equalizing schemes-or other alternatives such as educational parks102 or metropolitan school districts-are not necessarily
preferable to community controlled schools. They may not even be
inconsistent with some community control schemes. They are, nonetheless, alternatives. Community control presumes the existence of
a functioning community of like-minded citizens. Family-powerequalizing plans stress the importance of individual, not community,
choice. To opt for one, and to give it constitutional status, cuts off
alternatives prematurely without educational or legal warrant. For
that reason, judicial intervention ought to be directed toward preserving and promoting choices, rather than toward favoring any particular educational reform such as community control.
A second line of constitutional argument focuses not on the
quality of education that community controlled schools would assertedly ensure, but on the community's political rights to govern
its own schools. It challenges the practice of city-wide elections for
school board members, asserting that that practice ensures the election of an all middle-class board, thereby effectively disenfranchising
the poor and black urban communities. In Owens v. School Committee of Boston103 that city's black community has brought suit in
federal court, arguing that the city's practice of city-wide elections
for all school board members acts to deny ghetto residents equal
protection of the law, in that it affords the ghetto community no
effective way of articulating its interests through the election procedure. The Owens plaintiffs have requested district elections to the
city-wide board and a decentralization of many educational functions. Their argument is based on those cases which have noted that
an otherwise acceptable election scheme would be unconstitutional
if it "operated to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial
or politicial elements of the voting population."104 Admittedly, the
Supreme Court has never yet identified such a situation; its remarks
are dicta only. In Chavis v. Whitcomb,1° 5 however, a three-judge
federal district court, sitting in the Southern District of Indiana,
overturned a plan for electing members of the Indiana state legislature, because that plan included ghetto blacks in a large multimem102. Educational parks are district-wide educational centers which offer a wider
range of services than any single school could afford.
103. 304 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mass. 1969).
104. Fortsen v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). See also Burns v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73 (1966); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
105. 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969), prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 984 (1970).
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ber district dominated by a middle-class white majority, thereby
ignoring the cognizable interests of the ghetto community and denying it effective representation.
Chavis and Owens are factually distinguishable. In Chavis, the
ghetto was an unrepresented part of a larger multimember district,
yet was as populous as other, single-member districts created by the
same plan. In Boston, every school board member is elected on a
city-wide basis.106 Indeed, the Boston arrangement might conceivably fit within the "uniform district principle" which the Chavis
court instructed the Indiana legislature to "give considerable attention to."107 Yet this distinction does not foreclose the community
control advocates' argument in Owens. Central both to the Chavis
opinion and to the plaintiff's claim in Owens is a set of legal and
political assumptions which signal a substantial shift in judicial thinking about representation and governance, and which afford unprecedented legitimacy to the exercise of power by homogeneous
groups.
The root assumptions are that groups of individuals act in political concert and that, moreover, they have a judicially protected
right to do so. The court in Chavis undertook as its principal task
the identification of "an injured minority group residing in a modem 'ghetto.' " 108 It devoted the largest part of its opinion to an
examination of demographic, social, and political indicators which
bear on that identification. Such inquiry is quite different from the
Supreme Court's practice, in the reapportionment cases, of focusing
on dilution of individual voting power, rather than on group interests.100 The Court's practice, while avowedly politically neutral,
in fact represents an emphasis on one among a variety of possible
principles of political representation. As Justice Frankfurter argued
in Baker v. Carr,11° attempting to steer the Court away from this
"political thicket":
One cannot speak of "debasement" or "dilution" of the value of the
vote until there is first defined a standard of reference as to what a
vote should be worth. What is actually asked of the Court ... is to
106. Another possible distinction-that Chavis concerns legislative districts while
Owens concerns school districts-has apparently been rejected by the Supreme Court.
See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 393 U.S. 818 (1969). See also Avery v. Midland
City, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Oliver v. Board of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
107. 305 F. Supp. at 1392.
108. 305 F. Supp. at 1373.
109. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964). Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) does not recognize the possible effect of
gerrymandering on racial groups.
110. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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choose among competing bases of representation-ultimately, really
among competing theories of political philosophy.m
The Chavis court would substitute the community for the individual, at least where the community is a "modern ghetto"-black,
poor, and geographically isolated. It is clear, however, that the
Chavis court would not accept any black community. The court reviewed income levels, housing standards, educational records, and
political representation on a district-by-district basis; and it ultimately excluded from the ghetto one relatively prosperous black
district. Having completed that task, it presumed, without supporting argument, that the area that it had mapped out shared certain
political concerns. It presumed further that those concerns could be
adequately represented in the state legislature only by an elected
representative of the ghetto. Thus, the court found that the ghetto
had a constitutional right to identifiable representation, at least
with respect to matters of state-wide concern, even though the state
had granted it no formal and separate political existence.
This set of presumptions relied on in Chavis is inconsistent with
the notion of a uniform districting system, a notion that the court
alluded to in several instances. If one accepts the court's reasoning,
it is not just any uniformity of treatment-such as all single-member
districts, all multimember districts, or an at-large election for the
entire state-that will satisfy the constitutional requirements. Uniformity must give way to the interests of the ghetto. As the court
itself noted, "the maximum size of the uniform districts should, of
course, not be so large as to create the improper dilution of minority
group voting strength found in the instant case."112
The Chavis assumptions about the legitimacy of bloc representation lie at the heart of the Boston school districting suit and indeed
are basic to the political philosophy inherent in decentralized schools.
The proponents of decentralization argue that black and poor
parents have identifiable common interests in the education of their
children, that those interests are distinguishable from middle-class
concerns, and that those interests require recognition in a school
district managed by and for the community. That view is, of course,
inconsistent with the conventional philosophy of American schooling-a philosophy which insists that the mission of the schools is to
Americanize, to make all children equal by making them all the
same, a philosophy which has sought since the mid-nineteenth century to produce a common breed of men by socializing them in com111. 369 U.S. at 300 (dissenting opinion).
112. 305 F. Supp. at 1392.
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mon public schools. In part, the control argument embodies a
recognition of the failure of that conventional view. It demands that
the common-schooling ideal be seen not as the exclusive method to
provide schooling, but merely as one alternative solution embodying
-like the "one man-one vote" reapportionment standard-one particular set of political and social value choices. The community control supporters argue that since the universal and common approach
has failed, it is necessary to adopt an approach which emphasizes the
particular and the different. They would establish their own school
district in the same way that Chavis created an electoral district.
Such an argument puts the courts in an uncomfortable position.
It suggests the limitations of the analysis that the Owens court indulged in:
The system of electing members of a governmental board in an atlarge election is, of course, a device quite commonly used. There are
advantages and disadvantages to the use of either the at-large or the
district system of election. One supposedly ensures the election of
the type of official who can command a wide support throughout
the whole community and will be representative of and responsive
to the needs of the community as a whole. The other is designed to
ensure representation of the particular interests of the separate
geographical segments of the community, perhaps at the expense of
the general interest.11s
Yet, as Chavis demonstrates, the at-large system preserves the niceties
of the individual vote but effectively diminishes the power of the
minority group. If the interest of the group-or of certain otherwise
powerless groups-demands recognition, the recitation of alternatives is simply inadequate.
The alternative judicial course rejected in Owens is, however,
profoundly troubling. That course requires the acceptance of the
Chavis rationale to elevate the single-member, community-based
election district to constitutional status, the application of that
principle to school board elections, and the extension of that doctrine to force decentralization. It binds the courts to a set of assumptions about group interests--and about the adequacy of group
representation to secure those interests--that are rooted in assertion
and ideology rather than in law. It commits the court to an almost
constant search for a community entitled to a political recognition,
even though a court is ill-equipped to make that search. It suggests
that there is one set of standards for poor and black communities
and another, thus far unarticulated, set for other sorts of commulll!. !104 F. Supp. at 1!129.
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nities. Moreover, it assumes that only through decentralization can
group representation be achieved. By making that assumption, it
preserves like-mindedness at the expense of heterogeneity and choice
-attributes which, for schooling if not for electoral districts, are
considered by some authorities to be virtues. The inadequacy of
adjudication as a means of making this difficult set of decisions is
likely to lead the courts not to insist on decentralization, but rather
to defer to the body politic for guidance and political choice making.114
IV.

CONCLUSION

At this point in time, the most significant judicial foray into
the realm of community control is the opinion of the federal district court in Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Board of Education.ms
That opinion provides little encouragement to those who would
have the courts resolve this tangle of educational, legal, and political questions.
The series of occurrences that gave rise to the litigation in this
case began in the early 1960's, when the Norwalk school board
concluded that de facto segregation was both morally wrong and
educationally damaging, and took steps to eliminate it. While the
board's first thought was to bus children into and out of the black
ghetto, its ultimate remedy was to put an end to de facto segregation
by phasing out the town's ghetto schools and busing all of the black
students out of the ghetto and into the white schools, while white
children would continue to go to neighborhood schools. 116 Initially,
this plan received the approval of all segments of the community, but
in 1968 as the last ghetto elementary school was about to be closed,
the local chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) protested. When the school board ignored the protest, CORE sued
the board, seeking to prevent it from closing the ghetto school. 117 In
114. This is not, of course, to suggest that the courts ought not inten·ene when
legislative action betrays dear racial bias. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960).
115. 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969).
116. The board relied on several factors to justify its decision not to bus white
children into the ghetto schools. It took into account what it regarded as the bad
reputation of the ghetto area, a factor which it felt would disquiet parents throughout
the community. It felt that Norwalk schools could deal more readily with blacks'
psychological adjustment to predominantly white schools than they could with white
students' and parents' adjustments to what had been predominantly black schools. Most
important, the board believed that it was not politically feasible to require white
schoolchildren to attend the ghetto schools.
117. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969).
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its suit, CORE called at first for the reopening of black neighborhood schools, arguing on equal protection grounds that if whites
were entitled to neighborhood schools, then blacks were entitled to
their own schools as well. Subsequently, CORE modified the suit
to insist upon cross-busing, arguing, again on equal protection
grounds, that if black children were to be bused to white schools,
then white children should be bused to black schools.
The suit posed for the court the kinds of dilemmas that have
already been discussed. How actively, for example, should the court
review the decision of the school board? Should it defer to the
wisdom of the board, which was exercising its statutory responsibility for making policy, or should it reject the board's claim to
expertise? What sort of evidence should the court consider in reaching its decision? Should it rely on the central finding of the Coleman
Report that "a pupil's achievement is strongly related to the educational backgrounds and aspirations of the other students in the
school . . . . Children of a given family background when put in
schools of different social composition, will achieve at quite different
levels," 118 and thus conclude that social-class integration is necessary
in order to secure equality of opportunity? Or is it appropriate for
a court to seek out evidence designed to measure the sentiment of
the affected community with respect to integration? If a court determines that one community wants to manage its mvn schools,
should that determination be conclusive? Which community's interest should the court bear foremost in mind: that of the black
neighborhood, that of the city community, or that of some broader
community? The court did not deal with all of these questions. No
evidence was introduced concerning the educational advantages of
neighborhood schools or the disadvantages of busing. Thus, the
court was not obliged to decide between integrated education and
community controlled education. It considered only whether the
manner in which the integration of policy was implemented unduly
burdened the black community, and it ultimately approved the
Norwalk busing scheme.119
The court might have focused on the burden implicit in the
fact that black children were one hundred times more likely to be
bused to school than were white children. The court might then
have required the school board to provide compelling justification
118. U.S. NATL. CENTER FOR Eouc. STATISTICS, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTU22
Coleman ed. 1966).
119. 775 of 1,581 Negro and Puerto Rican children in Nonvalk were bused in the
1967-68 school year, while only 39 of 7,984 white children were bused. 298 F. Supp. at
216.
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for not adopting an approach that more equitably distributed the
burden of being bused. But instead the court adopted a wavering
legal standard. Although the opinion appears to subject the board's
decision to "rigid scrutiny,"120 the standard that was ultimatelyand improperly-relied upon requires that the plaintiffs show "government action which without justification impose[d] unequal burdens or award[ed] unequal benefits . . . ."121 The explanation for
this discrepancy lies in the court's characterization of the complaint
as alleging neighborhood, rather than individual, discrimination.
The court upheld the school board's plan because the board had
justifiably distinguished between neighborhoods which were appropriate for schools and others-primarily the ghetto--which were
inappropriate.122
•
The opinion made it clear that individuals could not be treated
so cavalierly: "It is fundamental that the rights of individuals in
similar circumstances must be governed by the same rules. . . ." 123
Neighborhoods, however, were an altogether different matter:
Although people are equal, and governmental classification by race
will not be tolerated, neighborhoods are not. . . . While neighborhoods theoretically remain equal, as a practical matter they do not
remain equal and the law does not command that they be treated
equally. . . . It is doubtful that residents of one neighborhood appropriately may claim the benefits of circumstances similar to another, where a neighborhood classification has been made.124
Indeed, the court hinted that the school board may have had an
obligation to distinguish between good and bad neighborhoods:
"Had the board ignored this reality, it might well not have fulfilled
its duty of providing the best education for all children of Norwalk. "125 The court's distinction between individuals and neighborhoods is very troublesome. The plaintiffs in the case were not
neighborhoods, but organizations representing individual citizens.
The rights being asserted were those of individual schoolchildren
who happened to live in a single neighborhood and who were
treated differently from the children of other neighborhoods. Yet the
court never faced the most vital constitutional issue: Can the happenstance of residence justify differential treatment of individuals?
120. 298 F. Supp. at 223.
121. 298 F. Supp. at 225.
122. In a sense, this decision is the converse of Chavis: it recognizes the existence of
neighborhoods but denies their asserted common concerns.
123. 298 F. Supp. at 222.
124. 298 F. Supp. at 222-23 (emphasis deleted).
125. 298 F. Supp. at 223.
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Instead, it concluded "that there is a correlation between the less
desirable (from the standpoint of location of schools) neighborhoods
of Nonvalk and neighborhoods of predominantly black and Puerto
Rican population. . ."126 and that this correlation justified the
school board's decision to close schools in the black and Puerto
Rican sections of Norwalk.
If the court's legal reasoning poses problems, the tacit educational assumptions are almost indefensible. For instance, the court
stated: "Just as one neighborhood may afford a more suitable location for a factory, another may provide a more suitable environment
for the location of a school." 127 The opinion never suggests what
that "more suitable environment" entails, although from the distinction that is drawn one might surmise that green grass, quiet,
and an area inhabited by whites are primary attributes. Yet why
should these be essential to successful schooling? Many communities
have sought out factories for schooling sites, both because they provide big, cheap buildings and because they provide some tangible
connection between school and community.128 These political and
educational judgments are not matters in which the courts usually
regard themselves as having competence, and the Norwalk court's
foray into this area only affirms the wisdom of the usual judicial
attitude.
In one sense, the conclusion of this discussion is obvious. Community control is constitutionally permissible if the community has
opted for such control and if dissenting members of the community
may send their children out of the local district to integrated schools.
Community control is not, however, constitutionally required. To
give it or any promising educational alternative constitutional status
would restrict choice without pedagogic or legal warrant.
The discussion raises a second set of questions, concerning the
role of the judiciary in resolving social issues. Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the segregation litigation has been its incapacity to
bring about the changes that judicial decrees have mandated. The
law requiring the disestablishment of dual-school systems is plain.
But equally plain is the fact that in the 1968-69 school year, fourteen years after Brown Il, 129 less than one-fifth of all Southern black
126. 298 F. Supp. at 222.
127, 298 F. Supp. at 222.
128. In Philadelphia, the Mantua Mini School and the Advancement School are both
located in former factories. AGENDA FOR CHANGE (1969), a study recently completed by
the Harvard Graduate School of Education, urges that Lowell, Massachusetts, convert an
old mill into an educational resource center.
129, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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schoolchildren attended even nominally integrated schools.130 In
part, the explanation for this massive failure of implementation
rests with the perseverance of the Southern white community in
developing strategies to evade Brown. Yet a substantial part of the
explanation lies with the failure of litigation as a device for bringing
about social and political change.
Litigation concerning social policy may be viewed as a means of
benefitting a badly treated community, with only minimal involvement of that community. This fact, which has seemed to be litigation's particular strength, now appears also to be a significant
weakness. Courts can declare rights and obligations, but their capacity to enforce those declarations is far more limited. Enforcement
depends primarily on the willingness of the beneficiary to lay claim
to his newly gotten rights. The fact that "freedom-of-choice" plans
served to perpetuate segregated schools in the South131 indicates the
inability of the intended beneficiary-in that instance, the Southern black community-to assert its rights. Had blacks exercised their
option and enrolled at the formerly all-white schools, the freedomof-choice plans could conceivably have led to integrated schools. In
fact, however, the blacks remained with such consistency in the
schools which they had previously attended that the Supreme Court
was led to conclude that freedom-of-choice plans did not constitute
a permissible method of disestablishing the dual school systems. 132
In would be inappropriate to fix blame for this incapacity to
assert rights. Yet the lesson seems plain: the role of the courts in
dealing with these questions will almost inevitably be a limited one.
It has been suggested in this Article that the stated judicial concern
with free association should be focused on preserving educational
alternatives, such as community control, where those alternatives do
not violate the constitutional command of equal educational opportunity. Beyond that, the questions remain ideological and political. They will be resolved not by judicial decree, but rather by an
assertion of community will on the part of those most directly and
most adversely affected by the public schools.
130. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1969, § 4, at I, cols. 5-6.
131. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Goss v. Board of
Educ., 373 U.S. 687 (1963).
132. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).

